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Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name
is Lisa Heinzerling. I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. I have also been a visiting professor at the Harvard and Yale
Law Schools. I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School,
where I served as editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Law Review.
After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William Brennan of the
U.S. Supreme Court. I was an Assistant Attorney General in the
Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s
Office for three years before coming to Georgetown in 1993. My expertise
is in environmental and administrative law. I am also the Vice-President of
the Center for Progressive Regulation.
The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and
educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in
the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health,
safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to
protect health, safety, and the environment, and rejects the conservative view
that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of
private markets. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform
policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public
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understanding of the issues, and open the regulatory process to public
scrutiny.
My testimony today concerns the Office of Management and Budget’s
Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations [hereinafter “Draft 2003 Report” or “Report”], 68 Fed. Reg.
5492 (Feb. 3, 2003). This draft report raises issues in four broad areas;
briefly, the report:
1) proposes new guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of federal
regulation;
2) provides estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation
for the period 1992-2002;
3) seeks guidance on improving cost-benefit analysis of regulations
related to homeland security; and
4) invites commentators to discuss and critique current approaches to
regulation of emerging risks.
My specific conclusions about the Draft Report can be summarized as
follows:
1) OMB’s new proposed guidelines for cost-benefit analysis
encourage agencies to skirt the laws under which they act; create
onerous new analytical burdens for agencies, particularly agencies
whose mission is to protect health, safety, and the environment; and
further entrench economic methodologies that systematically
undervalue health, safety, and environmental protection.
2) The Draft 2003 Report’s estimates of the costs and benefits of
federal regulation are unreliable, arbitrary, confusing, and highly
skewed against regulations designed to protect health, safety, and the
environment.
3) OMB’s new solicitation of comments on cost-benefit analysis of
homeland security serves as an example of OMB’s overweening
ambitions for this methodology as a means of evaluating public
policy.
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4) OMB’s solicitation of comments on the regulatory system’s
approach to emerging risks reflects OMB’s current bias against
precautionary legislation that aims to prevent health, safety, and
environmental problems before they cause harm.
Far from using cost-benefit analysis as a neutral tool to evaluate public
policy (which, as will be made clear below, it is not in any event capable of
being), OMB instead uses cost-benefit analysis to attack regulations the
administration does not like, and has so far declined to deploy cost-benefit
analysis to evaluate policies (such as those reducing regulatory requirements
and handing out agricultural subsidies) that the administration desires on
other grounds. This is not to say we think cost-benefit analysis should be
used more often, but it is to say that using it in a politically biased fashion
belies the objective purposes OMB has asserted in defending this type of
analysis. Given the biases evident in OMB’s draft report, OMB’s ritualistic
invocations of principles of “sound science” must be taken with a large grain
of salt.
I. OMB’s Proposed Cost-Benefit Guidelines
OMB’s proposed guidelines for cost-benefit analysis are chock-full of
new analytical requirements for regulatory agencies, requirements that can
be expected to slow down the already-ossified rulemaking process and to
impose significant new burdens on resource-starved agencies. More
specifically, OMB’s proposed guidelines encourage agencies to skirt
congressional directives in favor of following OMB’s cost-benefit agenda;
they require a kind of analysis – cost-effectiveness analysis – for health and
safety regulation that, when combined with discounting, produce biased and
misleading results; they inappropriately require the quantification of
uncertainty and eschew precautionary approaches to risk assessment; they
further entrench OMB’s misguided efforts to translate human lives and
health into monetary terms; and they also further entrench OMB’s
trivialization of future harms through the technique of discounting.
In the proposed guidelines, OMB requires extensive analysis of
regulatory alternatives, along with the alternatives’ comparative costs and
benefits, by the administrative agencies. Even so, remarkably, OMB does
not explain why or how its resource- and time-intensive new analytical
requirements will achieve better regulatory results than the existing cost3

benefit guidelines. OMB does not explain, in other words, why the
“significant investments of agency staff and resources” (Draft 2003 Report,
at 5498) required by its new guidelines are justified, except in the most
conclusory terms. Nor does OMB explain why, throughout the cost-benefit
guidelines, health, safety, and environmental regulation is singled out for
special new analytical requirements, even though OMB’s own estimates of
the costs and benefits of regulation would suggest that air pollution
regulation, for example, is one of the best regulatory investments we have
made. Why hobble a thoroughbred? OMB does not explain.
A. Dismissing Statutory Directives
OMB’s cost-benefit review of major agency rules will, even after its
new cost-benefit guidance goes into effect, still take place under Executive
Order No. 12866. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5513.) In its “Statement of
Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” Executive Order No. 12866 asserts:
Federal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are
required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are made
necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the
public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. . . .
[I]n choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies
should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires
another regulatory approach. (E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).)
In the existing guidance on cost-benefit analysis of agency rules, OMB
states that agency analysis should discuss whether the agency is addressing a
market failure or other compelling public need. OMB then states: “If the
proposed action is a result of a statutory or judicial directive, that should be
so stated.” (Executive Analysis of Federal Regulation Under Executive
Order
12866
(January
11,
1996),
available
at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html.)
OMB’s proposed new guidance on cost-benefit analysis takes a quite
different attitude to statutory directives. No longer, it appears, is it enough if
the statute under which an agency operates directs it to take action that might
4

be in tension with cost-benefit principles. Under the proposed guidance,
agencies will be required to “demonstrate that the proposed action is
necessary” because of a market failure or other compelling problem. (Draft
2003 Report, at 5514.) Only after OMB tells agencies to identify the need
for action does OMB admit that a statute might speak to the question at
hand. Even here, however, OMB seems anxious to preserve as much room
for executive departure from congressional directives as possible: “If your
regulatory intervention results from a statutory or judicial directive, you
should describe the specific authority for your action, the extent of discretion
available to you, and the regulatory instruments you might use.” (Draft
2003 Report, at 5514.)
Later in the Draft Report, OMB again invites agencies to do their best
to skirt statutory directives when they conflict with OMB’s cost-benefit
principles: “You should also discuss the statutory requirements that affect
the selection of regulatory approaches. If legal constraints prevent the
selection of a regulatory action that best satisfies the philosophy and
principles of Executive Order No. 12866, you should identify these
constraints and estimate their opportunity cost.” (Draft 2003 Report, at
5518.)
Most federal laws do not require, and many do not even allow,
agencies to use OMB-style cost-benefit analysis in developing regulatory
policy. In its new guidelines for cost-benefit analysis, however, OMB
appears to encourage, or even require, agencies to circumvent statutory
directives when they conflict with OMB’s perspectives on regulatory policy.
These guidelines thus effectively put OMB, rather than Congress, in charge
of defining the scope of agency authority. This is not OMB’s role, either
under federal statutes or under the federal Constitution.
B. Requiring Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Health and Safety Rules
Another new feature of OMB’s proposed guidelines is the
requirement that agencies issuing rules “for which the primary benefits are
improved public health and safety” conduct cost-effectiveness analysis.
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5516.) That is, OMB proposes to require agencies to
state the costs per unit of regulatory benefit produced. In the simplest case,
this would mean that agencies protecting public health and safety would
report the costs per life saved of their rules, in addition to conducting costbenefit analysis where possible.
5

This new requirement is less benign than it might appear. There are
two large problems with the kind of cost-effectiveness analysis OMB
envisions.
First, although OMB states that “[c]ost-effectiveness analysis provides
a rigorous way to identify options that achieve the most effective use of the
resources available without requiring you to monetize all of the relevant
benefits or costs” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5516), it is important to recognize
that cost-effectiveness analysis, as practiced by OMB, nevertheless requires
agencies to value human lives and health, even if not in monetary terms.
This is so because OMB requires agencies to use discounting, a technique
that results in a much lower value for lives saved in the future than for lives
saved in the near term. Moreover, surprisingly, the lack of monetization,
when combined with OMB’s approach to discounting, can produce results
even less favorable to health, safety, and environmental protection than costbenefit analysis, properly conducted, would.
This conclusion requires some explanation. OMB insists on
discounting life-saving benefits that accrue in the future, such as the saving
of lives from long-latency diseases like cancer, even for purposes of
conducting cost-effectiveness analysis. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5523.) In this
setting, the lives saved, rather than the monetary value of the lives saved, are
discounted. Suppose EPA proposed a regulation that would save 100 people
from a type of cancer that has a latency period of 20 years. OMB would
require EPA to discount these 100 lives over 20 years before calculating the
cost-effectiveness of this rule. Through the “magic” of discounting at
OMB’s preferred discount rate of 7 percent, these 100 lives would be
converted to 25.84 lives. In conducting cost-effectiveness analysis after
discounting, EPA would divide the estimated costs of its rule by a number
reflecting only about one-quarter of the actual lives saved by the rule, thus
greatly enlarging the perceived costs per life saved of the rule.
This combination of cost-effectiveness analysis and discounting has a
long and troubled history in regulatory circles. Commonly circulated tables
purporting to show that health and environmental protection costs hundreds
of millions, or even billions, of dollars for every life saved use this
methodological combination. Without discounting, the costs per life saved
reflected in these tables drops by orders of magnitude. (See Lisa
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Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981
(1998).)
Moreover, because in cost-effectiveness analysis regulatory benefits
are presented as, say, human lives, rather than as dollars, discounting loses
any theoretical foundation it might otherwise have. Human lives cannot be
put in the bank; they do not earn interest; they do not compound the way
money does. It is inappropriate and deeply misleading to suggest that a rule
saving 100 lives in 20 years from now, as in the example cited above, will
actually save 25.84 lives.
Discounting benefits such as lives saved for purposes of costeffectiveness analysis undervalues such lives in another way as well. Where
human lives are translated into monetary terms, it is appropriate to increase
their monetary value over time due to expected increases in income, as there
is good evidence that the willingness to pay for decreased risk increases with
income. But such increases in value will not be reflected in costeffectiveness analysis, since no one has ever (to my knowledge) proposed
compounding lives themselves to reflect income growth. Thus, while future
lives are discounted according to the prevailing rate of return on financial
investment, as though they were money, future lives are not compounded to
reflect income growth. Yet the logic of discounting depends on economic
conditions that would themselves lead to growth in income. The failure to
account for this fact in cost-effectiveness analysis understates the benefits of
life-saving regulation.
A final problem created by cost-effectiveness analysis of health and
safety regulation is the selection of the measure of effectiveness. In its
official policy statements, OMB has appeared to embrace a preference for
measuring the effectiveness of life-saving regulation according to the
number of life-years saved by the regulation, rather than according to the
number of lives saved. (OMB, Ranking Regulatory Investments in Public
Health, Analytical Perspectives on FY 2003 Budget, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/spec24.pdf.) Tellingly, in its costbenefit practices as applied to individual policies, OMB appears to insist on
assessing the wisdom of life-saving policies according to the number of lifeyears they save. (Consider, again, the cost-benefit analysis of the “Clear
Skies”
initiative,
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf, at pp. 35-37.) In OMB’s
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hands, rules that save the elderly become less cost-effective – and thus less
justified – than rules that save younger people.
C. Quantifying Uncertainty
Another significant innovation in OMB’s proposed guidelines is the
requirement that agencies conduct a formal probabilistic analysis for rules
with “economic effects that exceed more than $1 billion per year,” and also
for other rules where possible. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5523.) This
requirement adds significantly to the analytical burdens of agencies charged
with protecting health, safety, and the environment.
OMB’s new analytical requirement also incorporates OMB’s hostility
to the precautionary principle which is embedded in many of our laws
concerning health, safety, and the environment. OMB suggests, for example,
that where uncertainty about regulatory consequences arises from a lack of
data, an agency “might consider deferring the decision … pending further
study to obtain sufficient data.” OMB also warns agencies that their analysis
“should not reflect any unstated or unsupported preferences, even for such
worthy objectives as protecting public health or the environment.” (Draft
2003 Report, at 5523.) In these passages, OMB signals an intent to
dismantle the precautionary approach that has been embraced by health,
safety, and environmental agencies, based on their statutory mandates, for
decades.
D. Translating Lives Into Dollars
In these proposed guidelines, OMB continues and deepens its
misguided efforts to translate human lives into dollars.
OMB adds numerous new analytical requirements for agencies that
seek to “transfer” estimates of benefits from one setting to another. (Draft
2003 Report, at 5519-5520.) These requirements will add significantly to the
already-existing analytical burdens of the agencies, without any explanation
from OMB about why such requirements are necessary or about whether
they respond to some specific problem OMB has encountered. These
requirements also, in some cases, threaten to prevent agencies from using
well-documented, peer-reviewed economic studies in their regulatory
analyses.

8

For example, without elaboration, OMB forbids “benefits transfer” in
some contexts, advising agencies that they “should not use a value
developed from a study involving small marginal changes in a policy context
involving large changes in the quantity of the good.” (Draft 2003 Report, at
5520.) A careful student of OMB’s previous cost-benefit reports will recall
that OMB has, in the past, severely criticized EPA’s retrospective analysis of
the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act on precisely this ground. EPA’s
peer-reviewed report concluded that clean air regulation had produced at
least $22 trillion in net benefits from 1970-1990. (EPA, The Benefits and
Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990, at ES-8 (Oct. 1997).) This sunny
conclusion about a regulatory program has always been too much for OMB
to bear. Thus, in previous reports which (unlike this year’s report) reviewed
regulations issued prior to 1992, OMB included estimates from EPA’s Clean
Air Act report but assiduously surrounded these estimates with skeptical
arguments about why the report likely overestimated the benefits of cleaning
the air. One of the most prominent of these arguments was that the health
risks from breathing polluted air were much higher than the workplace risks
analyzed in the studies upon which the value of a statistical life used in
EPA’s report was based. OMB thought it unlikely that people exposed to
the high risks from polluted air would be able to pay as much to avoid those
risks because the amount they would have to pay would represent an
appreciable portion of the average income. (OMB, Report to Congress on
the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, at 32 (1998).) Thus,
perversely, OMB would give a lower value to more serious risks. In its
proposed cost-benefit guidelines, OMB appears to entrench this strange
approach by forbidding benefits transfer in the situation described here.
In instructing agencies how to translate lives into dollars, OMB also
appears to lean heavily in favor of evidence based on a “willingness to pay”
(WTP) framework rather than a “willingness to accept” (WTA) framework.
The difference is that in the first case, the “consumer” of risk must pay to
avoid it, while in the latter case, she is given the ability to decide whether to
participate in the market for risk at all. Empirical evidence documents that
when people are given the freedom to decline to participate in markets for
risk, they often do so. OMB asserts, without elaboration, that WTP is
superior because it “provide[s] a more conservative measure of benefits.”
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5518.) While it may be true that WTP yields lower
estimates of regulatory benefits (because WTP is so heavily limited by a
person’s capacity to pay), this does not mean that the estimates it yields are
therefore more “conservative” or even more reliable.
9

Indeed, the great irony is that the most commonly used studies of
“willingness to pay” in matters of risk are, in fact, studies of “willingness to
accept” money in exchange for increased risk: they are studies of the wage
premium workers in the 1970s purportedly received in return for taking on
increased risk in the workplace. Yet OMB suggests that the values derived
from these studies are, if anything, too low. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5519.)
Nowhere does OMB come to terms with this internal consistency in its
report.
In discussing monetization of lives, OMB also asks agencies to
provide monetary estimates of both lives and life-years. (Draft 2003 Report,
at 5521.) As OMB acknowledges, providing estimates of the monetary value
of life-years implies that there may be a difference in the monetary value of
lives depending on the age of the people being saved. (Draft 2003 Report, at
5521.) OMB also hedges on this point, however, suggesting that perhaps the
elderly place a high value on reducing risks to themselves, after all. (Draft
2003 Report, at 5521.)
In analyses conducted in less public settings, however, OMB has not
been so reticent about the relative value of the old and the young. In several
analyses of the benefits of air pollution regulation, for example, OMB has
insisted upon including different monetary values for people whose lives are
saved by this regulation, depending on whether they are under or over 70 at
the
time
they
are
saved.
(See,
e.g.,
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf (valuing lives of people
under 70 at $3.7 million, and lives of people over 70 at $2.3 million).)
Finally, OMB does not instruct agencies how they might adjust
monetary values for life and health upward in situations where the lives and
health are protected from future harm. Although, as discussed in the next
section, OMB spends a great deal of time justifying its decision to require
agencies to discount future benefits, OMB does not tell agencies to increase
future benefits to account for the income growth that OMB itself expects to
occur in the future.
E. Discounting

10

OMB’s proposed guidelines also further entrench another problematic
analytical technique – the technique of discounting future regulatory
benefits, including lives saved.
As a general matter, the use of discounting systematically and
improperly downgrades the importance of environmental regulation. While
discounting makes sense in comparing alternative financial investments, it
cannot reasonably be used to make a choice between preventing harms to
present generations and preventing similar harms to future generations. Nor
can discounting reasonably be used even to make a choice between harms to
the current generation; choosing between preventing an automobile fatality
and a cancer death does not turn on prevailing rates of return on financial
investments.
In addition, discounting tends to trivialize long-term
environmental risks, minimizing the very real threat our society faces from
potential catastrophes and irreversible environmental harms, such as those
posed by global warming and nuclear waste.
OMB’s proposed guidelines add two new features to this problematic
exercise. First, OMB asks agencies to consider “the time lag between when
a rule takes effect and when the resulting physical improvements in health
status will be observed in the target population” – a time period it calls the
“cessation lag.” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.) This new analytical
requirement is burdensome without being helpful. OMB cannot even tell us
whether the “cessation lag” is different from the latency period for human
disease. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.) This requirement threatens to waste
agency resources without providing any meaningful information about
regulatory policy. As with many of OMB’s analytical requirements,
however, the concept of a cessation lag does have the “benefit,” when
employed, of reducing the apparent benefits of health, safety, and
environmental protection.
Second, OMB includes in its proposed guidelines a discussion of
discounting regulatory benefits to future generations. Despite the unstable
methodological foundations of such a practice (no one suggests we can ask
the yet-to-be-born what their willingness to pay for reduced risk is), and
despite the ethical problems associated with discounting the well-being of
future generations, OMB forges ahead with this practice. OMB blithely
explains that since future generations are likely to be wealthier than we are,
discounting is appropriate. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5522.) Nowhere does
OMB come to terms with the fact that if future generations are indeed
11

wealthier than we are, they will likely be willing to pay more to reduce risk
than we are, and thus it is not at all clear that their lives should be discounted
relative to ours. Nor does OMB acknowledge the possibility that large-scale
social, political, and environmental upheavals could lead to greater, rather
than less, poverty in future generations.
OMB does try to justify discounting the utility of future generations
by saying that great uncertainty exists with respect to the appropriate
discount rate over very long time intervals – but OMB acknowledges, at the
same time, that this justification merely supports the lowering of the
discount rate applied to benefits accruing to future generations. (Draft 2003
Report, at 5523.) It does not support the use of discounting in the first place,
in the context of future generations. So the only argument we are left with
for discounting benefits accruing to future generations is that they are likely
to be richer than we are.
It is hard to overstate the effect of discounting on benefits that will
accrue to future generations. In the year 2100, the Census Bureau predicts,
the population of the United States will be approximately 571 million
people. At OMB’s 7 percent discount rate, saving the entire population of
the United States one century from now becomes equivalent, in cost-benefit
terms, to saving about 658,000 people today. With the magic of a calculator,
over 570 million lives simply disappear.
II. OMB’s Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation
The aggregate estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation
in the Draft 2003 Report are so pervaded by biases, and so riddled by error,
that they are virtually worthless as an indicator of the general wisdom of
current approaches to federal regulation. These biases and errors surface in
OMB’s estimates of costs and benefits; in OMB’s decisions about what
types of federal programs to exclude from cost-benefit review; in OMB’s
choices about which federal regulations to exclude from its cost-benefit
tables; and in OMB’s commentary on these estimates. Finally, the tables
presenting OMB’s estimates are so confusing as to be almost indecipherable
to anyone not willing to devote many hours to decoding them; even then
they are hard to fathom.
A. OMB’s Underestimation of Regulatory Benefits
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OMB uses a myriad of approaches to make regulatory benefits look as
minuscule as possible. I will rest with one important example. OMB goes
out of its way to present alternative estimates of the costs and benefits of
three rules issued between October 2001 and September 2002. (Draft 2003
Report, at 5501, Table 8.) Included in this analysis is EPA’s rule controlling
emissions from large nonroad engines. Whereas OMB first reports that this
rule will produce $410 million per year in reduced engine operating costs
and $900 million to $7.88 billion in air quality benefits in the year 2030
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5496, Table 4), OMB later opines that the rule will
produce from $913 million to $4.8 billion in annual benefits. (Draft 2003
Report, at 5501, Table 8.) What accounts for the difference in these two
estimates?
At the high end, it is simply not clear how OMB has managed to
reduce annual benefits so dramatically. That is all I can say.
At the lower end, however, it is all too clear (if one reads deeply
enough into documents outside OMB’s report). OMB managed to estimate
that the benefits of the nonroad engine rule could be as “low” as $913
million per year only through a bizarre and implausible analytical technique
whose only justification, so far as I can tell, is to make regulatory benefits
appear smaller than they are. This strained methodology is noteworthy
because it tackles air pollution control, an area of environmental protection
where health benefits are both clear and widespread.
OMB’s strange new analytical technique (which appears in this Draft
Report, in the economic analysis of the administration’s Clear Skies
initiative, and in the economic analysis of the nonroad engine rule) begins
with four steps. First, reduce the value of statistical life by considering only
“contingent valuation” studies (surveys), not studies of actual market
behavior (in contradiction of OMB’s preference, expressed elsewhere, for
the latter over the former). Second, assign a lower monetary value to the
lives of the elderly than to those of younger people. Third, by looking at
average life expectancy, determine the number of life-years remaining to
these two populations. Fourth, divide the monetary value you have used by
the number of remaining life-years. These calculations will produce an
estimate of the monetary value per life-year saved for elderly and younger
populations, respectively. Oddly enough, despite the initial assumption that
the lives of the elderly are worth less in monetary terms, this strange
calculation has the effect of making them worth more in the end: because
13

they have fewer life-years left to live, each life-year is worth relatively more
when the value of life is fixed in advance. (OMB has not yet come to terms
with the internal inconsistency of this new approach.)
After these calculations, assume that air pollution regulation saves
five years of life, no matter how old the person who is saved is. Next,
multiply the number of life-years saved (five) by the monetary value you
have calculated for a life-year in the relevant population. Now, you once
again have arrived at a monetary value for a statistical life: but the beauty of
this approach is that this value has magically shrunk through the strange
calculations described above. (To see this bizarre analysis in action, see, for
example, EPA’s cost-benefit analysis of the “Clear Skies” initiative,
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf, at pp. 35-37.)
What is the theoretical or empirical justification for this strange new
methodology, beyond its capacity to shrink regulatory benefits? OMB does
not say.
B. OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of Deregulatory Actions from CostBenefit Review
One looks in vain in this year’s draft report for any evidence of some
of the most high-profile agency activities of the past two years: that is,
actions taken to reduce regulatory requirements for private industry. It is as
if EPA had not, for example, changed the New Source Review program of
the Clean Air Act. By subjecting regulatory actions to cost-benefit review,
but allowing deregulatory actions a free pass, OMB exhibits its clear bias
toward deregulation and against government intervention.
C. OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of So-Called “Agency Transfer Rules”
from Cost-Benefit Review
The Draft 2003 Report does not report the costs and benefits of what
it calls “agency transfer rules,” or rules that transfer money from the federal
government to private parties. Indeed, the Report does not even list such
rules if they were issued prior to October 1, 2001; it lists such rules only if
they were issued subsequent to that date. (Draft 2003 Report at p. 5497,
Table 5.) For the “agency transfer rules” issued between October 1, 2001,
and September 30, 2002, OMB provides only a brief description of the rules
without any estimate whatsoever of their economic costs or benefits. In its
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2002 Report to Congress, “Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to
Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities” [hereinafter “Stimulating Smarter
Regulation”], OMB explained in a footnote why it had not analyzed the
costs and benefits of transfer rules: “Rules that transfer Federal dollars
among parties are not included because transfers are not social costs or
benefits. If included, they would add equal amounts to benefits and costs.”
(OMB Final 2002 Report, at p. 36 n. 30.)
The “transfer rules” listed in the Draft 2003 Report include many very
expensive government programs. The money spent on these programs is not
available for other purposes. The expenditures associated with these
programs are therefore opportunity costs in the classic sense; if, for example,
the federal government were not going to spend an estimated $1.3 billion to
pay peanut farmers to buy out their government quotas (see fourth item on
Table 5, Draft 2003 Report at 5497; for cost estimate, see
http://www.ewg.org/farm/peanuts/faq_peanuts.php, citing Congressional
Budget Office estimate of program costs), it would presumably have that
$1.3 billion to spend on something else. Elsewhere in the Draft 2003
Report, OMB states that one of its purposes in conducting cost-benefit
analysis is to assess the opportunity costs of federal government programs.
(Draft 2003 Report, at 5518.) In addition, in its proposed new guidelines for
cost-benefit analysis, OMB explicitly requires agencies to the distributional
effects of transfer payments. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5524.) OMB’s complete
and utter failure to consider the opportunity costs and distributional
consequences of the “agency transfer rules” in Table 5 flouts OMB’s own
official policy statements.
Furthermore, OMB has provided no principled definition of what
constitutes a “transfer rule.” Technically speaking, the transfer rules that lie
outside the scope of conventional cost-benefit analysis are those rules that do
not attempt to change, or have the effect of changing, the nature or level of
economic goods or services provided by private economic actors. They
simply transfer money from one entity to another after market actors have
chosen the nature and level of goods and services to be provided.
The agency rules OMB includes within the category of “transfer
rules” do not all meet this definition. For example, OMB includes as
“transfer rules” agricultural subsidy programs that clearly affect the nature
and level of agricultural goods provided in this country. There can be little
15

doubt, for example, that the agency rules associated with the 2002 farm
bill’s sugar program (listed in Table 5, 2003 Draft Report, at 5497) will
affect the production of sugar and thus affect the primary behavior of market
actors. Yet OMB provides no explanation as to why these rules are “transfer
rules” rather than rules that would otherwise be subject to economic
analysis. If the federal government chose to affect sugar production through
more conventional regulation – such as, for example, the tightening of
environmental standards for sugar production – then the costs associated
with that regulation would appear in OMB’s cost-benefit tables. It is purely
arbitrary to characterize rules such as the sugar program rules as “transfer
rules” simply because they affect market actors’ behavior through subsidies
rather than through government commands.
Even more fundamentally, OMB’s decision not to examine the costs
and benefits of transfer rules exposes the general poverty of OMB’s
analytical methodologies. Transfer programs – especially those in which the
government takes money from general revenues and gives it to a specific
person or entity – are filled with potential for waste and special-interest dealmaking. They offer an opportunity, moreover, for the rich to get richer at the
taxpayer’s expense. In the Peanut Quota Buyout Program, for example, it is
estimated that the largest peanut farmers will get the most money from the
program.
(For
information
about
the
program,
see
http://www.ewg.org/farm/peanuts.) Even if this were indeed a true transfer
program – one which had no effect on the market behavior of peanut farmers
– it should nevertheless be relevant, as a matter of public policy, that money
is being transferred from the relatively worse off (consider the average
taxpayer) to the relatively better off (the biggest peanut farmers get the most
money). OMB’s muteness in the face of this transfer reflects the general
inability of cost-benefit analysis to take the distributional effects of
government programs into account in adjudging their wisdom. Even so, to
have OMB wash its hands of review of this kind of program, which in this
case is predicted to cost taxpayers $1.3 billion, and to turn its steely gaze
instead on air pollution rules that seem to be the best regulatory bargain of
all, reflects a massive failure of OMB to set sensible priorities for its own
oversight activities.
Perhaps OMB will respond by suggesting that it has no authority to
question the priorities reflected in, for example, agricultural subsidies that go
predominantly to the richest farmers. Here, it suffices to observe that OMB
has displayed no such reticence when it comes to questioning the priorities
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embodied in health, safety, and environmental legislation (a topic to which
we will return in Part II, below).
At the very least, OMB should provide: (1) a clear definition of what
it means by “agency transfer rules”; (2) an explanation of why the rules
listed in Table 5 meet this definition; (3) a listing of the economic costs of
the transfer rules it deems inappropriate for cost-benefit analysis, so that the
reader of this Report might at least be able to judge the relative expense
associated with the transfer rules OMB does not choose to analyze and the
social regulations it does; and (4) as required by its own proposed costbenefit guidance, an analysis of the distributional effects of these transfer
rules.
D. OMB’s Arbitrary Exclusion of Highly Efficacious Rules from its
Estimates of the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations
Even where information about a rule’s costs and benefits is available,
OMB sometimes arbitrarily excludes this information from its estimates of
the costs and benefits of federal regulation. These exclusions, though
arbitrary, do serve one (illegitimate) purpose: because the rules excluded
were highly efficacious, their exclusion from OMB’s aggregate estimates of
the costs and benefits of federal regulation makes those aggregate estimates
look less favorable to regulation than they would with these programs
included.
First, OMB excludes three air pollution rules – which it refers to as
“mobile source” rules even though only one of the rules has to do with
mobile sources – from its estimates. (Draft 2003 Report, at p. 28.)
Although OMB concedes that these rules are “projected to achieve
substantial reductions in [sulfur dioxide] and [particulate matter] emissions,”
OMB nonetheless leaves these rules out of its analysis due to “the
uncertainties associated with benefits transfer.” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502,
& n. 14.) This is an amazing statement. Virtually all of the monetized
benefits of health, safety, and environmental rules – insofar as these benefits
include reduction in risk of death – involve “uncertainties associated with
benefits transfer.” Benefits transfer is simply the practice of using monetary
valuations obtained in one context – such as risks in the workplace – to
value benefits in another context – such as environmental risks. OMB’s
observation that these uncertainties also arise from differences in “sources of
emissions, meteorology,” etc. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502), also would
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apply to any attempt to value pollution reduction according to the value per
ton of pollution reduced. OMB makes no effort whatsoever to explain why
these three rules, in particular, pose the problem of uncertainty to such a
degree that they should not be included in its analysis.
Second, OMB also excludes analysis of the costs and benefits of other
rules, but without mentioning it. For example, OMB does not discuss the
costs and benefits of OSHA’s ergonomics standard and the FDA’s
regulation of tobacco and tobacco products. In last year’s report, OMB
explained that it was excluding these rules because they had been overturned
– in the former case by Congress, in the latter by the Supreme Court.
(Stimulating Smarter Regulation, at 37, n. 32.) Yet OMB has in the past
included rules subject to legal challenge in its analysis. (Stimulating
Smarter Regulation, at 50, Table 9 (listing costs and benefits of roadless area
conservation rule); id. at 104 (noting that the implementation of this rule had
been enjoined by a federal district court).) One would think it would be
useful for OMB to consider whether any of the rules that have been
invalidated – either by Congress or the courts – were sensible enough to
justify inquiry into whether they could be resurrected in some form. In
particular, since this is a report to Congress on the costs and benefits of
federal regulation, it seems reasonable to expect OMB to advise Congress as
to how the one rule that Congress has invalidated under the Congressional
Review Act – OSHA’s ergonomics standard – would fare under OMB’s
current standards for cost-benefit analysis. For its part, OSHA thought the
ergonomics rule would produce at least $9 billion in annualized benefits.
(See
GAO
letter
to
Senator
Jeffords,
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/majrule/d01200r.htm (11/29/00).)
It appears that OMB has also excluded other major rules from this
year’s analysis, without saying so. For example, last year, OMB excluded
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) revised National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter from its
analysis on the ground that it thought this would prevent “double-counting.”
(Stimulating Smarter Regulation, p. 37, n. 32.) Yet this year, OMB says that
its estimates of the costs and benefits of major rules for the period come
from Chapter IV of OMB’s 2000 Report. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.) The
2000 Report included estimates of the costs and benefits of the revised
ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. It does not appear, however, that
OMB included these estimates in this year’s draft report, as the numbers for
EPA in the draft report would be much higher – and show air pollution
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regulation in an even more favorable light – if the NAAQS were included. If
OMB decides to include the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS from its
estimates in order to prevent “double-counting” of costs and benefits, OMB
should explain how it has concluded that attaining and maintaining the
revised NAAQS will involve only those air pollution control programs it has
listed in its Draft 2003 Report.
In sum, OMB has arbitrarily excluded rules from its estimates of costs
and benefits – and has done so in a manner that appears systematically to
paint regulation in a less favorable light than if those rules were included.
E. OMB’s Grudging Attitude Toward Finding Benefits From
Environmental Regulation
If one merely looked at the tables in OMB’s report, one would expect
OMB to conclude that the best regulatory bargain around is regulation of air
pollution. Time and again, OMB’s numbers reflect how large the benefits of
air pollution regulation are in comparison to its costs. Yet, instead of
praising this kind of regulation from an economic point of view, OMB does
all it can to minimize the impression that regulating air pollution has
produced overwhelmingly positive results. For one thing, as noted above,
OMB arbitrarily excludes effective pollution regulations from its analysis. In
addition, in two different places, OMB goes out of its way to express its
skepticism about the benefits of air pollution control. (Draft 2003 Report, at
5494, n. 8; 5502, n. 12.)
A less skeptical, more objective, attitude toward air pollution control
would be in order if OMB were truly interested in neutrally reviewing
federal regulatory programs. Such an attitude might, at the least, have led
OMB to catch sooner its whopper of a mistake in last year’s report: as OMB
acknowledges in this year’s draft report, it overestimated the costs of air
pollution control by $20 billion per year in last year’s report. (Draft 2003
Report, at 5493.) One might perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether a
more neutral attitude toward environmental regulation might have caused
OMB’s analysts to question the magnitude of this number – and to discover
the mistake it was about to make – before the 2002 report was published.
F. OMB’s Tables Are Confusing and Opaque
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For an office that crows about the transparency of its analysis, OMB’s
tables showing the costs and benefits of federal regulation are surprisingly
hard to understand, to follow, and to critique. OMB should do a better job
of explaining what it is doing.
First of all, OMB’s report is very hard to follow if one does not, in
addition to reading this report, read the many OMB reports on costs and
benefits that have preceded it. OMB frequently refers to previous reports for
exceedingly important points, without elaboration. For example, as
mentioned above, OMB refers to its 2000 Report as the source of its
estimates of costs and benefits for the years 1995-1999, yet it appears that
OMB has made significant adjustments to the 2000 Report’s estimates –
without saying so or explaining why.
Second, OMB, confusingly, presents separate charts for different
periods of time (1992-93, etc.), without ever presenting, in one place, a chart
showing all of the regulations and cost/benefit estimates on which it is
relying. This haphazard mode of presentation is hard to follow, and also
raises questions about what exactly OMB is doing. OMB should provide its
estimates in a form that allows a reader to check its work. In this regard, it
would help matters greatly if OMB would describe the rules it is appraising
more precisely by, for example, giving a cite from the Federal Register to
each rule it analyzes in this Report.
Finally, OMB places crucial reliance on two documents that do not
appear to be in the public record. In estimating the benefits of reducing
emissions of nitrogen oxides from stationary and mobile sources, OMB cites
a letter from Don Arbuckle to Tom Gibson, dated May 16, 2002, and a
memo to EPA’s NSR docket from Bryan Hubbell of EPA. (Draft 2003
Report, at 5502.) OMB relies on these documents in justifying its decision
to value benefits of reducing the same air pollutant – nitrogen oxides –
differently depending on whether it comes from stationary or mobile
sources. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5502.) I have attempted to obtain these
documents from the web or, in the case of the Hubbell memo, from Bryan
Hubbell himself via an email request, but so far I have been unable to obtain
them. Thus, as far as I can tell, OMB’s assertions about the relative benefits
of reducing pollution from stationary and mobile sources cannot be
evaluated by the public. These memos should be made public – preferably
on OMB’s web site, so that they are easy to find when reviewing OMB’s
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Draft Report – so that OMB’s important assumptions about the benefits of
air pollution control can be analyzed.
III. Terrorism and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Last year, OMB reported that it had cleared 58 new regulations in
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. (Stimulating Smarter
Regulation, at 7 & Table 1.) OMB stated that many of these rules did not
have an impact of $100 million or more on the economy and thus had not
been accompanied by regulatory impact statements. (Stimulating Smarter
Regulation, at 11.) Even so, surely some of these rules were economically
significant – yet an analysis of their costs and benefits did not appear in last
year’s report, nor does one appear in this year’s report. OMB assures the
reader that “all the rules related to September 11th received priority attention
from the appropriate reviewers, and that the Administration’s best solutions
to respond to potential terrorist attacks were implemented” (Draft 2003
Report, at 5499), but it provides no specific analysis of these important rules.
The result is almost surreal: whereas this year’s report gives us
detailed analysis of rules such as the Department of the Interior’s “Early
Season Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 2002-2003” and its “LateSeason Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations 2002-2003” (Draft 2003
Report, at 5495, Table 4), it provides no analysis whatsoever of the costs and
benefits of the large-scale regulatory changes that have taken place after
September 11. Looking at OMB’s draft report, one would think our country
had spent the last year absorbed in the minutiae of the bird-hunting season.
It is not that cost-benefit analysis of terrorism-related regulation will
be very helpful, as discussed below. Rather, it is that OMB’s apparently
arbitrary selection of the rules to be included in its report on the costs and
benefits of federal regulation renders the report virtually meaningless in
evaluating federal regulatory policy. Attending to the costs and benefits of
adjusting the bird-hunting season, without analyzing the effectiveness of all
we have done after September 11, makes a mockery of OMB’s pretense of
expertise in priority setting.
This year’s draft report does, to be sure, invite comment on how OMB
might go about analyzing terrorism-related regulations. (Draft 2003 Report,
at 5499.) However, it does so by asking how best to conduct cost-benefit
analysis of such regulations. (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.) It is reasonable
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to predict that any such analysis of terrorism-related regulations is doomed
to failure. Prevention of terrorism, like many other important social aims, is
not capable of being incorporated into the narrow and rigid framework of
cost-benefit analysis.
Perhaps the best evidence for this proposition comes from an effort,
pre-September 11, to assess the costs and benefits of improving airline
security in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Shortly after TWA Flight 800
crashed into the ocean off the coast of Long Island in 1996, Robert Hahn,
now the director of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
tried to assess the costs and benefits of enhanced airport security. (Robert
W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, Regulation: The Review of
Business & Government, vol. 19 no. 4 (1996).) He concluded that the costs
of improved airport security were not worth the benefits. The benefits, he
argued, were quite small given that, at that time, only an average of 37
people per year died in terrorist incidents. He stated that even if that number
were increased ten-fold or even one-hundred-fold, the benefits of improved
airport security still would not exceed the costs. September 11, of course,
increased the terrorist death toll for 2001 by almost one-hundred-fold from
Hahn’s estimate.
Where upper-bound risks are radically uncertain, as they are in the
case of terrorism (and as they often are when it comes to health, safety, and
environmental problems), it defies reason to act as though they can be
meaningfully absorbed into the cost-benefit framework. Perhaps the best that
can be done is to ask, not whether measures to combat such risks pass the
cost-benefit test, but whether the measures we have adopted are reasonably
likely to reduce these risks.
IV. Inviting Criticism of the Precautionary Principle
In a new feature of its report, OMB invites commentators to discuss
U.S. approaches to analyzing and managing “emerging risks.” (Draft 2003
Report, at 5498-99.) Specifically, OMB asks for comment on: (1) “the ways
in which ‘precaution’ is embedded in current risk assessment procedures
through ‘conservative’ assumptions or through explicit ‘protective’
measures”; (2) examples of risk assessment approaches “which appear
unbalanced”; and (3) “[h]ow the U.S. balances precautionary approaches to
health, safety and environmental risks with other interests such as economic
growth and technological innovation.” (Draft 2003 Report, at 5499.)
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The wording of this invitation for comments suggests OMB is anxious
to receive comments that are hostile to the principle of precaution. Other
portions of the Draft Report reinforce this interpretation. (See, e.g., Draft
2003 Report, at 5523 (cautioning against incorporation of precaution in risk
assessments).) It is too early to tell what will come of this process. Given the
fiascos created by OMB’s previous open-ended invitations to commentators
to submit criticisms of the current regulatory system (recall the “hit list” of
the 2001 Report), it will be worth monitoring OMB’s response to the
comments it has solicited on the precautionary principle.
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